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In the context of its Digital Single Market Strategy (DSMS) the EU Commission is currently engaged in a 
discussion of whether the liability principles and rules envisaged by Directive 2000/31 (the Ecommerce 
Directive) should be amended. One of the principal concerns in relation to unlicensed online 
intermediaries (notably unlicensed hosting providers) is that these have been increasingly said to invoke 
the safe harbour immunities in the Ecommerce Directive lacking the conditions for their application. 
This alleged abuse has led to a distortion of the online marketplace and the resulting ‘value gap’ 
indicated by some rightholders.  
 
This contribution discusses a recent proposal advanced in France which asks to remove the safe harbour 
protection pursuant to Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive for hosting providers that give access to 
copyright works.  
 
After addressing some of the points raised by the French proposal, this work concludes that the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not erred in its interpretation of relevant provisions of the 
Ecommerce Directive and that – in practice  – the removal of safe harbour protection for passive hosting 
providers that give access to copyright works would not provide any distinct advantages to rightholders. 
Overall, the current framework already provides an adequate degree of protection: what is required is 
a rigorous application by national courts of the principles enshrined in the Ecommerce Directive, as 






Introduction: the current EU policy debate 
 
In 2015 the EU Commission released its Digital Single Market Strategy1 (DSMS), in which it presented 
steps towards the realisation of a connected digital single market to generate additional growth in 
Europe in the course of its mandate. The DSMS intends to tackle a number of areas, including 
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ecommerce, telecoms, cross-border sales, interoperability and standardisation, copyright and 
intellectual property (IP) enforcement.  
 
With regard to the latter two, the DSMS addresses the role of online intermediaries and the relevant 
liability system as included in Directive 2000/312 (the Ecommerce Directive) and known as ‘safe 
harbour’ regime. On the one hand, internet intermediary service providers are not liable for the content 
that they transmit, store or host, as long as they act in strictly a passive manner. On the other hand, 
upon obtaining knowledge of the unlawful nature of relevant content, intermediaries must act 
expeditiously to remove or disable access to it.3 
 
While acknowledging the relevance of the safe harbour regime for “the development of the Internet in 
Europe”4, the DSMS highlights some of the alleged shortcomings of the current system, including: the 
number of false positives and false negatives; differences in national practices; and difficulties in 
identifying the boundaries of intermediaries’ liabilities.5 With particular regard to the latter, the 
Commission announced that it would assess whether it is necessary “to require intermediaries to 
exercise greater responsibility and due diligence in the way they manage their networks and systems – 
a duty of care.”6 
 
As one of the follow-ups to its DSMS, in Autumn 2015 the EU Commission launched a public 
consultation on platforms and online intermediaries.7 Among other things, the Commission sought 
views on whether the liability regime envisaged by the Ecommerce Directive is still fit for purpose8, and 
intermediaries should be required to exert a greater duty of care.9  
 
Following the conclusion of the public consultation in early 2016, the Commission published a report 
on the responses received (1,034 through the official form).10 Although the majority of respondents 
submitted that the existing liability principles under the Ecommerce Directive are appropriate, views 
were divided regarding some aspects of the intermediary liability regime. This is notably so with regard 
to: the concept of a mere “technical, automatic and passive nature” of information transmission by 
information society service providers pursuant to Recital 42 in the preamble to the Ecommerce 
Directive; the need to clarify existing categories of intermediary services in the Ecommerce Directive 
(these being currently mere conduit, caching, and hosting) and/or the potential need to establish 
further categories of intermediary services; the need to impose a specific duty of care regime in relation 
to certain categories of illegal content.11 According to rightholders, the unclear liability framework – 
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together with uncertainties surrounding the scope of certain exclusive rights such as the right of 
communication to the public – negatively affects licensing and has ultimately resulted in an imbalance 
in the online marketplace in favour of intermediaries (also known as ‘value gap’).12 As such, the 
Commission should take action to clarify the rules applicable to online platforms that use protected 
content.13 Similar concerns were echoed by the Commission itself in its Communication entitled 
Towards a more modern, more European copyright framework, released in late 2015. There the 
Commission highlighted how the activities of some intermediaries may go beyond simple hosting or 
mere conduit of content and, as such, would not be eligible for the safe harbour exemptions.14 
 
As a direct follow-up to the platforms and online intermediaries public consultation, in mid-2016 the 
Commission released its Communication on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market.15 In this 
document the EU Commission announced that, while “maintinain[ing] a balanced and predictable 
liability regime for online platforms” (possibly to be intended as the one currently envisaged by the 
Ecommerce Directive)16, it will also: address the issue of ‘value gap’ through sector-specific regulation 
in the area of copyright; assess the role of intermediaries in the IP enforcement process; and engage 
with platforms in setting up and applying voluntary cooperation mechanisms pursuant to the approach 
known as ‘follow the money’.17 The Communication highlights how “[p]roviding more clarity to online 
platforms with regard to the exemption from liability for intermediaries under that Directive in light of 
any such voluntary measures taken by them would, therefore, be important in enabling them to take 
more effective self-regulatory measures.”18 
 
From the preceding discussion it appears that in relation to intermediaries’ activities the principal 
concern is two-fold: ‘false’ intermediaries and ‘non-(sufficiently-)collaborative’ intermediaries. On the 
one hand, some infringing intermediaries have allegedly invoked the safe harbour immunities lacking 
the conditions for the application of relevant provisions under the Ecommerce Directive, notably Article 
14. This alleged abuse has led to a distortion of the online marketplace and the resulting ‘value gap’ 
indicated by rightholders. On the other hand, despite the wording of the Ecommerce Directive (in 
particular Recitals 40 and 49 in the preamble thereof, as well as Article 16) some intermediaries have 
at times refrained from setting up cooperation mechanisms with rightholders, fearing that this 
intervention would render them no longer neutral and, therefore, ineligible for safe harbour protection.  
 
The present contribution will address the first concern, ie infringing ‘false’ intermediaries unduly 
invoking safe harbour protection. It will discuss how the current legal framework – as interpreted in 
relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – already addresses the concerns 
raised by rightholders, and provides adequate and clear tools to pierce the veil of safe harbour 
protections when these are abused.  
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This contribution is structured as follows: following the presentation of a recent proposal in France 
aimed at removing safe harbour protection pursuant to Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive for 
hosting providers that give access to copyright works, some of the points raised by the French proposal 
will be addressed. These include: the allegedly different liability regime (notably: exemptions from and 
limitations of liability) applicable to different categories of intermediaries; the seemingly incorrect 
application by the CJEU of relevant principles included in the Ecommerce Directive; and the effects of 
removing safe harbour protection for hosting providers that give access to copyright works.  
 
This work holds the view that the CJEU has not erred in its interpretation of relevant provisions of the 
Ecommerce Directive and that – in practice – the removal of safe harbour protection for passive hosting 
providers that give access to copyright works would not provide any distinct advantages to rightholders. 
Overall, the current framework already provides an adequate degree of protection: what is required is 
a rigorous application by national courts of the principles enshrined in the Ecommerce Directive, as 
interpreted by the CJEU. 
 
 
I. A French proposal 
 
In 2015 France’s Conseil supérieur de la propriété littéraire et artistique (High Council For Literary and 
Artistic Property) gave mandate to a mission led by Pierre Sirinelli to explore what changes could be 
proposed at the EU level to enable “the effective enforcement of copyright and related rights in the 
digital environment particularly on platforms which disseminate protected content.”19 The mission 
concluded that, although it may not be appropriate to reform the liability framework under the 
Ecommerce Directive in relation to mere conduit and caching, it is necessary to clarify that the immunity 
in Article 14 therein does not apply to information society service providers whose role extends beyond 
that of a technical service provider as defined in that directive. Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive 
states: 
 
 “1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of 
information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the 
service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of 
the service, on condition that: 
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as 
regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal 
activity or information is apparent; or 
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove or to disable access to the information. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the 
authority or the control of the provider. 
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in 
accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to 
terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States 
of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information.” 
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The allegedly incorrect application of the regime envisaged by Article 14 to “false hosting providers”20 
has occurred because of the incorrect approach that the CJEU took in Google France v Luis Vuitton21 
(Google France). In that 2010 decision the CJEU linked the interpretation of Article 14 to Recital 42 in 
the preamble to the Ecommerce Directive. The latter states that: 
 
“The exemptions from liability established in this Directive cover only cases where the activity 
of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of operating and 
giving access to a communication network over which information made available by third 
parties is transmitted or temporarily stored, for the sole purpose of making the transmission 
more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies 
that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the 
information which is transmitted or stored.”22 
 
 In its Google France decision, the CJEU held that that: 
 
“it follows from recital 42 in the preamble to Directive 2000/31 that the exemptions from 
liability established in that directive cover only cases in which the activity of the information 
society service provider is ‘of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature’, which implies 
that that service provider ‘has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is 
transmitted or stored’. 
Accordingly, in order to establish whether the liability of a referencing service provider may be 
limited under Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, it is necessary to examine whether the role 
played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, 
automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores.”23 
 
According to the proposal, in the first place Recital 42 in the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive would 
be only applicable to mere conduit and caching providers. It is Recital 46 that would instead relate to 
hosting providers, setting up – moreover – not an ‘exemption’ from liability (as Recital 42 does) but 
rather a ‘limitation’:  
 
“In order to benefit from a limitation of liability, the provider of an information society service, 
consisting of the storage of information, upon obtaining actual knowledge or awareness of 
illegal activities has to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information 
concerned; the removal or disabling of access has to be undertaken in the observance of the 
principle of freedom of expression and of procedures established for this purpose at national 
level; this Directive does not affect Member States' possibility of establishing specific 
requirements which must be fulfilled expeditiously prior to the removal or disabling of 
information.”24 
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In any case, even assuming that Recital 42 was applicable,  
 
“in recital 42, the Directive states that in order to occupy a passive role, the service provider 
must have neither knowledge of nor control over the information. But this does not mean that 
the service provider is necessarily passive just because it does not have knowledge and/or 
control of the information, or likewise that the service provider must have knowledge and 
control of the information in order to play an active role (as stated by the CJEU). 
In other words, the condition set out by recital 42 is necessary but insufficient.”25 
 
As such, the proposal asks to clarify at the EU level that intermediaries whose intervention consists of 
giving access to the public to copyright works and/or other subject-matter (including through the use 
of automated tools) do not fall within the scope of Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive.26 To this end 
and among other things, it advocates the introduction of a new provision (Article 9a) into Directive 
2001/2927 (the InfoSoc Directive). This would be to the effect that these intermediaries would need to 
obtain permission from the relevant rightholders to make their copyright works available to the public. 
This is because they – either alone or with the participation of users of their services – are said to 
implement the rights set out by Articles 2 (reproduction right) and 3 (right of communication to the 
public of works and right of making available to the public other subject-matter) thereof. Such 
permission would cover acts performed by users of their services when they send the copyright works 
and/or subject-matter to such intermediaries, as long as these users are not acting in a professional 
capacity.28 
 
Besides criticisms of the proposal focusing on – among other things – the risk of chilling effects on 
creativity and technological evolution29, it is submitted that this ‘clarification’ is unnecessary and 
possibly incorrect. This is so for a number of reasons. First, there is neither a substantial nor practical 
distinction between the notion of ‘exemption’ from and ‘limitation’ of liability in Recitals 42 and 46 in 
the preamble to the Ecommerce Directive. Secondly, the approach taken in Google France has been 
clarified further and correctly applied in relation to hosting providers in the later (2011) decision in 
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Directive. These service providers must obtain permission from the relevant rightholders as they, either alone or with the 
participation of users of their services, are implementing the rights set out by Articles 2 and 3. Such permission covers acts 
performed by users of their services when they send the copyright works and/or subject-matter to the aforementioned service 
providers in order to allow the access set out by sub-paragraph one, as long as these users are not acting in a professional 
capacity.” 
29 Commentaires des organismes professionnels membres du CSPLA sur le rapport relatif à l'articulation des directives 





L’Oréal v eBay30 (L’Oréal). Thirdly, under the current understanding of exclusive rights – notably the 
right of communication to the public – passive hosting providers could not be in principle held primarily 
or jointly liable with users of their services for the unauthorised doing of acts restricted by copyright. 
This would be so even assuming that these intermediaries do not enjoy protection under Article 14 of 
the Ecommerce Directive.  
 
 
II. The ‘exemption’ for hosting 
 
Recital 46 in the preamble to the Ecommerce Directive refers to a ‘limitation’ of liability rather than an 
‘exemption’ as is instead under Recital 42. Although this approach is in line with the original 
Commission’s proposal for a directive on ecommerce31, the way in which the relevant articles in the 
directive (as eventually adopted) are drafted suggests that – in this context and having regard to the 
different conditions applicable to mere conduit, caching and hosting – there is no substantial or 
practical difference between the notions of ‘exemption’ from and ‘limitation’ of liability. In this sense, 
Articles 12 to 14 of the Ecommerce Directive grant service providers an immunity from claims for 
damages caused by third-party users of their services.32 Overall harmonisation of the rules on 
intermediaries’ accessory liability was linked to the need of addressing existing and emerging disparities 
in Member States' legislation and case law that – as a result – were deemed to prevent the smooth 
functioning of the internal market.33 The principal rationale of safe harbours is arguably the same for 
the three types of service providers regulated by the Ecommerce Directive, ie to “ensur[e] both the 
provision of basic services which safeguard the continued free flow of information in the network and 
the provision of a framework which allows the internet and e-commerce to develop.”34 Overall it was 
believed that “[d]ifferent approaches in the legislation and case law emerging from Member States and 
the resulting legal uncertainty for cross-border activities gave rise to the risk of obstacles to the free 
provision of cross-border services.”35 
 
Furthermore, relevant CJEU case law shows that employment of different terms in Recitals 42 and 46 
of the Ecommerce Directive should not be intended as referring to distinct concepts. In relation to 
Article 14, in fact, in Google France both Advocate General (AG) Poiares Maduro in his Opinion36 and 
                                                             
30 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, C-324/09, EU:C:2011:474. 
31 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal 
market, COM/98/0586 final - COD 98/0325, on which see European Commission, Electronic commerce: Commission proposes 
legal framework, IP/98/999. In the same sense, see also European Commission, Commissioner Bolkestein welcomes political 
agreement on electronic commerce Directive, IP/99/952; and European Commission, Electronic commerce: Commission 
welcomes final adoption of legal framework Directive, IP/00/442. 
32 C Angelopolous, European intermediary liability in copyright: A tort-based analysis (2016) PhD thesis defended on 22 April 
2016 at the Instituut voor Informatierecht (IViR) – University of Amsterdam, available at 
http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/17229943, 43. 
33 Directive 2000/31/EC, cit, Recital 40. In the same sense, also Recital 16 in the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market, COM/98/586 final - COD 98/0325. 
34 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee - 
First Report on the application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on 
electronic commerce), COM/2003/0702 final, §65. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Opinion of Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro in Google France SARL and Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-
236/08), Google France SARL v Viaticum SA and Luteciel SARL (C-237/08) and Google France SARL v Centre national de 




the CJEU37 referred to Article 14 as envisaging an ‘exemption’ from liability, rather than a ‘limitation’. 
Similarly, and possibly in even stronger terms, in L’Oréal both AG Jääskinen in his Opinion38 and the 
CJEU39 referred consistently (and solely) to this provision as providing hosting providers with an 
‘exemption’ from liability, rather than a ‘limitation’. In relation to mere conduit providers, instead of 
referring to their ‘exemption’ from liability, in his recent Opinion in Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony (Mc 
Fadden), AG Szpunar spoke of ‘limitation’40 and ‘delimitation’41 of liability. 
 
While the substantial and practical implications of referring to intermediary immunities and limitations 
of or exemptions from (secondary/accessory) liability do not appear relevant, it should be recalled that 
in any case the so called ‘safe harbours’ do not shield intermediaries from injunctions.42 These are 
available – in copyright cases – under Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive and – in relation to IP rights 
other than copyright – the third sentence in Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC43 (the Enforcement 
Directive).44 In addition, as recalled above the various types of safe harbours are subject to different 
conditions depending on the type of service provider (mere conduit, caching, hosting) at hand, and 
Member States have transposed relevant provisions of the Ecommerce Directive differently into their 
own legal systems.45 In particular, while Articles 12 and 13 have been transposed verbatim into several 
national laws, the same has not always occurred in relation to Article 14: some Member States have 
deviated from the wording of the directive, and this has resulted in inconsistent approaches at the level 
of national case law. In this sense, it appears that – rather than the wording of provisions in the 
Ecommerce Directive – a different scope of intermediaries’ immunities and the conditions for 
injunctions against them depends more on relevant provisions in Member States’ legislations and their 
interpretation at the judicial level. For instance, both UK (s97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act) and Swedish (§53B of the Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works) laws envisage a 
‘knowledge’ requirement in their respective laws in relation to injunctions available against 
intermediaries in copyright cases. However, the interpretation of what ‘knowledge’ entails has 
diverged in these countries. On the one hand, in its landmark Newzbin 2 decision the High Court of 
England and Wales clarified that ‘actual knowledge’ under s97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act is to be intended as “knowledge of the use of the service to infringe, rather than upon the 
infringements committed thereby.”46 On the other hand, the Stockholm District Court (Stockholms 
                                                             
37 Google France SARL and Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08), Google France SARL v Viaticum SA and Luteciel 
SARL (C-237/08) and Google France SARL v Centre national de recherche en relations humaines (CNRRH) SARL and Others (C-
238/08), cit, [113] and [116]. 
38 Opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen in L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, C-324/09, 
EU:C:2010:757, §IX. 
39 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, cit, [108], [115], [116], [118]-[120], [122], [124]. 
40 Opinion of Advocate General Maciej Szpunar in Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, [64], [65], 
[74], [83], [97], [99]. 
41 Ibid, [70]. 
42 Opinion of Advocate General Maciej Szpunar in Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH, C-484/14, 
EU:C:2016:170, [68]. 
43 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, L 195, 16-25. 
44 Further to Recital 59 in the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive, Member States also enjoy significant freedom in establishing 
relevant requirements for the injunctions available under national law: see M Husovec, ‘Injunctions against innocent third 
parties: the case of website blocking’ (2013) 4(2) JIPITEC 116, 118. 
45 T Verbiest – G Spindler – GM Riccio – A Van der Perre, Study on the liability of internet intermediaries (2007) 
Markt/2006/09/E – Service Contract ETD/2006/IM/E2/69, 33 ff. 
46 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp and Others v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [147] (emphasis in 
the original text). 
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Tingsrätt) has recently interpreted ‘knowledge’ as requiring aiding and abetting third-party 
infringements in a criminal law sense.47  
 
 
III. L’Orèal v eBay: the intermediary’s active role  
 
The CJEU clarified and elaborated upon the implications of Google France in its subsequent decision in 
L’Oréal. This was a reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice of England and 
Wales, and had been made in the context of litigation between L’Oréal and online marketplace eBay 
over sale of counterfeit products over the latter’s platform. Among other things, the referring court had 
sought clarification regarding the scope of safe harbour protection pursuant to Article 14 of the 
Ecommerce Directive. More specifically, it had asked whether the service provided by the operator of 
an online marketplace is covered by Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive, and, if so, in what 
circumstances it may be concluded that the operator of an online marketplace has ‘awareness’ within 
the meaning of that provision.48 
 
The CJEU recalled the earlier decision in Google France, in which it held that to fall within the scope of 
Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive it is essential that the provider at hand is an intermediary 
provider within the meaning intended by EU legislature in the context of the Ecommerce Directive.49 
According to the Court, 
 
“That is not the case where the service provider, instead of confining itself to providing that 
service neutrally by a merely technical and automatic processing of the data provided by its 
customers, plays an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, those 
data”.50  
 
By ‘active role’ in a case like the one at hand it is intended to provide “assistance which entails, in 
particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting them.”51 It follows 
that it is not knowledge or its lack thereof that presupposes or denies an active role of the provider at 
hand, but rather the contrary: the application of Article 14 depends on whether the intermediary in 
question has played an active role, which is such as to give it knowledge or control over third-party 
activities.52 Thus, the safe harbour for hosting providers is trumped by awareness of facts or 
circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator should have realised that the relevant 
third-party content was unlawful and, in the event of it being so aware, failed to act expeditiously in 
                                                             
47 Bredbandsbolaget v The Pirate Bay, T15142-14 (27 November 2015) as commented in N Malovic, ‘Stockholm District Court 
refuses to issue blocking injunction against access provider’ (4 March 2016) The IPKat, available at 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/stockholm-district-court-refuses-to.html. 
48 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, cit [106]. 
49 Ibid, [112], referring to Google France SARL and Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08), Google France SARL v 
Viaticum SA and Luteciel SARL (C-237/08) and Google France SARL v Centre national de recherche en relations humaines 
(CNRRH) SARL and Others (C-238/08), cit, [112]. 
50 Ibid, [113], referring to Google France SARL and Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08), Google France SARL v 
Viaticum SA and Luteciel SARL (C-237/08) and Google France SARL v Centre national de recherche en relations humaines 
(CNRRH) SARL and Others (C-238/08), cit, [114] and [120]. 
51 Ibid, [123] 
52 In the same sense, see E Bonadio, ‘Trade marks in online marketplaces: the CJEU’s stance in L’Oréal v eBay’ (2012) 18(2) 
CTLR 37, 40; D Lievens, ‘L’Oréal v. eBay – welcomed in France, resented in England’ (2012) 43(1) IIC 68, 71, submitting that 
“[i]f … n online marketplace exercises a more active role in promoting offers for sale, their knowledge of, or control over, the 
content of those offers, including its trade mark infringing character, will be presumed.” 
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accordance with Article 14(1)(b) of the Ecommerce Directive.53 Lacking such active role, the ‘exemption’ 
from liability pursuant to Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive should then in principle apply, subject 
to the conditions provided for in that provision. This conclusion is in line with the wording of the 
Ecommerce Directive, and is further confirmed by paragraphs 118 and 119 of the L’Oréal decision, in 
which the CJEU held that, should the referring court conclude that eBay has not played an active role, 
it would then be “for it to ascertain whether, in the circumstances of the case before it, eBay met the 
conditions to which entitlement to the exemption from liability is subject under points (a) and (b) of 
Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31”.54 This means that: 
 
“In situations in which that provider has confined itself to a merely technical and automatic 
processing of data and in which, as a consequence, the rule stated in Article 14(1) of Directive 
2000/31 applies to it, it may none the less only be exempt, under paragraph 1, from any liability 
for unlawful data that it has stored on condition that it has not had ‘actual knowledge of illegal 
activity or information’ and, as regards claims for damages, has not been ‘aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent’ or that, having 
obtained such knowledge or awareness, it has acted expeditiously to remove, or disable access 
to, the information.”55 
 
The L’Oréal decision clarifies and reconciles Google France with the wording and aim of the Ecommerce 
Directive, and suggests a correct application of the principles embodied in the latter.  
 
 
IV. The removal of Article 14 safe harbour and intermediaries’ primary liability  
 
In addition to the points discussed above, even by removing the immunity pursuant to Article 14 of the 
Ecommerce Directive, any proposal to consider passive hosting providers as responsible for 
reproducing and communicating copyright works to the public would be hardly compatible with EU law 
and CJEU understanding of exclusive rights. This would be so in relation to a possible configuration of 
any authorised reproduction/communication to the public as source of – as it would appear from 
Sirinelli’s proposal – primary liability. This type of liability arises when one engages in tortious activity 
by his own acts or omissions.56 In light of recent CJEU case law it does not appear possible to hold 
passive hosting providers primarily liable for copyright infringement for copyright content provided by 
third-parties and made available through their services.  
 
With particularly regard to the right of communication to the public, this conclusion (applicable by 
analogy to other exclusive rights) appears supported by relevant CJEU case law, including the recent 
decision in Reha Training v GEMA57 (Reha Training). This was a reference for a preliminary 
ruling from the Regional Court of Cologne seeking clarification on – among other things – the notion of 
communication to the public under Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive as applied in the context of TV 
broadcasts made available by means of TV sets on the premises of a rehabilitation centre. This 
reference was made in the context of litigation between Reha Training (which operates a rehabilitation 
centre) and German collective management organisation GEMA, and concerned Reha Training's refusal 
                                                             
53 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, cit, [124]. 
54 Ibid, [118]. 
55 Ibid, [119]. 
56 With specific regard to the primary liability of intermediaries, see the discussion in J Riordan, The liability of internet 
intermediaries (2016:OUP), §5.06. 
57 Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und 
mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte (GEMA), C-117/15, EU:C:2016:379. 
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to pay a licence fee in connection with the making available of protected works (TV broadcasts) on its 
premises. 
 
The CJEU decided this case in a Grand Chamber composition. The reason for this was also (as AG Bot 
explained in his Opinion58) to allow the Court to clarify its case law in the area of communication to the 
public. The CJEU held that, in assessing the existence of an act of communication to the public, several 
criteria – each of which non-autonomous but rather interdependent in nature – should be taken into 
account.59 These criteria may come into consideration differently in different scenarios.60 This said, the 
concept of 'communication to the public' combines two cumulative elements: (1) an 'act of 
communication' that is (2) directed to a 'public'.61  
 
The first criterion, ie an ‘act of communication’, includes any transmission of a copyright work, 
irrespective of the medium used or the technical means employed.62 Each transmission or 
retransmission of a work that uses a specific technical means should be in principle individually 
authorised by the relevant rightholder.63 
 
Turning to the second criterion (that the communication at issue be directed to a ‘public’), the term 
'public' refers to an indeterminate number of potential recipients, and also implies a fairly large number 
of people64 (ie above de minimis65). In addition, to fall within the concept of 'communication to the 
public' a work must be directed to a 'new public", ie an audience that was not taken into account by 
the relevant rightholder when he authorised the initial communication of the work.66 In this context, it 
is necessary to take into consideration the indispensable role of the user without whom the ‘new public’ 
would not have access to the copyright work in question. More specifically,   
 
“in order for there to be a communication to the public, that user must, in full knowledge of 
the consequences of its actions, give access to the … protected work to an additional public 
and that it appears thereby that, in the absence of that intervention those ‘new’ viewers are 
unable to enjoy the … works”.67 
 
                                                             
58 Opinion of Advocate General Yves Bot in Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft 
für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte (GEMA), C-117/15, EU:C:2016:109, [4]. 
59 Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und 
mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte (GEMA), cit, [35]. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, [37], referring to SBS Belgium NV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM), C-325/14, 
EU:C:2015:764, [15] and case law cited therein. 
62 Ibid, [38] referring to SBS Belgium NV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM), [16] and case 
law cited therein. 
63 Ibid, [39], referring to SBS Belgium NV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM), [17] and case 
law cited therein. 
64 Ibid, [41], referring to Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA, C-306/05, 
EU:C:2006:764, [37]-[38] and case law cited therein. 
65 Ibid, [43], referring to Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso, C-135/10, EU:C:2012:140, [86]. 
66 Ibid, [45], referring to Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA, cit, [40] and [42]; and 
Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd (C-429/08), EU:C:2011:631, [197]. 
67 Ibid, [46], referring to Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA, cit, [42]; and Football 




Although to have an act of communication to the public several criteria should be considered, it appears 
that the indispensable role of the user may be a conditio sine qua non for Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive to apply, at least in the interpretation of Article 3(1) recently provided by AG Wathelet in GS 
Media v Sanoma (GS Media).68 
 
GS Media69 is a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Dutch Supreme Court. It was made in the 
context of proceedings between Sanoma (the publisher of Playboy magazine) and GS Media, 
concerning the publication by the latter on a website (GeenSijl) that it operates of hyperlinks to other 
websites hosting unpublished photographs taken for a forthcoming issue of Playboy. Sanoma 
succeeded in its actions before the Amsterdam District Court and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 
although these courts considered different aspects. The former held that by posting those hyperlinks, 
GS Media’s conduct amounted to an infringement because it encouraged visitors to GeenStijl to view 
the photographs unlawfully posted elsewhere and which, without those hyperlinks, would have not 
been easy to find. In contrast, the Court of Appeal held that, on the one hand, GS Media had infringed 
copyright by posting a cut-out of one of the photographs on the GeenStijl website but, on the other 
hand, had not made the photographs available to the public by posting the hyperlinks on its website. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal was appealed before the Supreme Court, which decided to stay the 
proceedings and seek guidance from the CJEU. 
 
In his Opinion AG Wathelet reviewed the two relevant cumulative criteria under Article 3(1) of the 
InfoSoc Directive: (1) an ‘act of communication’ of a work, (2) directed to a ‘public’. In relation to the 
former in particular, according to the AG in order to establish an act of communication, “the 
intervention of the ‘hyperlinker’ must be vital or indispensable in order to benefit from or enjoy works.” 
70 Hyperlinks posted on a website that direct to copyright works freely accessible on another website 
cannot be classified as an ‘act of communication’: the intervention of the operator of the website that 
posts the hyperlinks is not indispensable to the making available of the works in question to users.71 It 
is rather the intervention of the operator of the website that posts the protected works that is 
indispensable within Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
 
Further to the decision in Reha Training and the AG Opinion in GS Media, it is arguable that – in the 
case of a copyright work made available through the service of a passive online intermediary (host) – 
the latter would not commit an act of (unauthorised) communication to the public (potentially giving 
rise to primary liability for copyright infringement), because the role that is ‘indispensable’ in the whole 
process is the one of the third-party/uploader, rather than that of the hosting provider. A passive 
hosting provider does not do any of the acts restricted by copyright per se, nor does it usually authorise 
others to do so. This conclusion is in line with relevant case law at the level of individual Member 
States.72  
                                                             
68 Opinion of Advocate General Melchior Wathelet in GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises 
International Inc, and Britt Geertruida Dekker, C-160/15, EU:C:2016:221. 
69 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises International Inc, and Britt Geertruida Dekker, C-160/15 
(in progress: the CJEU decision in this case is due on 8 September 2016). 
70 Opinion of Advocate General Melchior Wathelet in GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises 
International Inc, and Britt Geertruida Dekker, cit, [57]. 
71 Ibid, [60]. 
72 In two recent decisions concerning YouTube’s liability for third-party copyright infringements, both the District Court of 
Munich (Landgericht (District Court) Munich I, 30 June 2015, 33 O 9639/14) and the Court of Appeal of Hamburg 
(Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal) Hamburg, 1 July 2015, 5 U 87/12) ruled out that YouTube could be considered liable, 
whether for primary or secondary copyright infringement, although liability was established under the German concept of 
‘Stoererhaftung’ (see JB Nordemann, ‘YouTube is a hosting provider, but one with extensive duties of care, say two German 
Courts’ (6 November 2015) Kluwer Copyright Blog, available at http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2015/11/06/youtube-is-a-
hosting-provider-but-one-with-extensive-duties-of-care-say-two-german-courts/). In a case concerning YouTube’s liability for 
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The situation would be different if: (i) the provider at hand authorised – contrary to current practices 
and content of most terms of service73 – users to upload and share content independently from 
whether these acts would infringe third-party rights; (ii) the provider was aware of the infringing nature 
of the content uploaded; or (iii) the provider played an ‘active role’ in the L’Oréal sense. These scenarios 
would however lead to situations similar to the ones envisaged – and sanctioned – by the current 
wording of Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive.  
In relation to (i) and (ii), in fact, the provider at hand would be arguably considered as authorising third-
party infringements and thus possess knowledge of third-party infringing activities within Article 
14(1)(a) of the Ecommerce Directive. As regards (iii), the intermediary at hand would not limit its role 
to a merely passive one and, as such, would not be protected by the safe harbour for hosting 
providers.74 If the provider intervened in a highly material way to make copyright works available to 
users without the relevant rightholders’ permission, eg by providing a cataloguing and indexing system 
that allows them to download all the component message of the film of their choice, then the provider 
would arguably commit an act of primary infringement.75 Similarly, if the provider itself made generally 
available certain content through its service that could not be otherwise accessed, the provider would 
likely exert a role that is ‘indispensable’. As long as the other conditions required under Article 3(1) are 
fulfilled, then it is arguable that the provider at hand would directly communicate copyright works. It 
follows that, for instance, the provision by a service provider of hyperlinks that would allow one to 
access a work by circumventing technological protection measures, or a work otherwise not freely 
accessible on a certain website would amount to an act of communication to the public. While this very 
issue is currently being considered by the CJEU in the pending reference in Stichting Brein v Filmspeler76, 
                                                             
third-party copyright infringements, the Court of Appeal of Madrid held that an intermediary could only lose its safe harbour 
protection for hosting when it has acquired actual knowledge of third-party infringing content made available through its 
service or exerts control over third-party content (Audiencia Provincial Civil de Madrid, sentencia 11/2014, 14 January 2014). 
In case concerning Yahoo!’s liability the Court of Appeal of Milan reversed the first instance decision and held that a provider 
that hosts third-party content and also offers additional services would remain neutral if its intervention is limited to the 
commercial exploitation of third-party content made available on its platform (Corte d’Appello di Milano, 7 January 2015; but 
see Tribunale di Roma, 27 April 2016 (commented in E Rosati, ‘Italian court says that rightholders do NOT have to indicate 
URLs when submitting takedown requests’ (9 May 2016) The IPKat, available at http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2016/05/italian-
court-says-that-rightholders-do.html) and Tribunale di Roma, 15 July 2016 (commented in E Rosati, ‘Rome Court of First 
Instance confirms once again that takedown requests do not need to include URLs’ (18 July 2016) The IPKat, available at 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2016/07/rome-court-of-first-instances-confirms.html) for a diverging approach. 
73 See for instance §5.1. of Facebook’s Terms, available at https://www.facebook.com/terms;  : “You will not post content or 
take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone else's rights or otherwise violates the law.”; §7.7. of YouTube’s 
Terms of Service, available at https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=GB&template=terms: “You agree that Content you submit 
to the Service will not contain any third party copyright material, or material that is subject to other third party proprietary 
rights (including rights of privacy or rights of publicity), unless you have a formal licence or permission from the rightful owner, 
or are otherwise legally entitled, to post the material in question and to grant YouTube the licence referred to in paragraph 
8.1 below.”; §5 of Twitter’s Terms of Service, available at https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en#twitterrights: “You are responsible 
for your use of the Services, for any Content you provide, and for any consequences thereof, including the use of your Content 
by other users and our third party partners. You understand that your Content may be syndicated, broadcast, distributed, or 
published by our partners and if you do not have the right to submit Content for such use, it may subject you to liability. Twitter 
will not be responsible or liable for any use of your Content by Twitter in accordance with these Terms. You represent and 
warrant that you have all the rights, power and authority necessary to grant the rights granted herein to any Content that you 
submit.” 
74 In this sense, see the UK decisions in Twentieth Century Fox and Others v Newzbin [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch); Paramount Home 
Entertainment International Ltd and Others v BSkyB and Others; Football Association Premier League v BskyB and Others [2013] 
EWHC 2058 (Ch); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp and Others v Sky UK Ltd and Others [2015] EWHC 1082 (Ch). 
75 This was indeed the conclusion of Kitchin J (as he then was) in Twentieth Century Fox and Others v Newzbin, cit, [125]. 
76  Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems (currently trading under the name Filmspeler), C-527/15 (in progress). The questions 
referred are the following: 
1) Must Article 3(1) of the Copyright Directive be interpreted as meaning that there is ‘a communication to the public’ 
within the meaning of that provision, when someone sells a product (mediaplayer) in which he has installed add-
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the conclusion advanced above appears in line with earlier CJEU decisions77, the Opinion of AG 





The preceding discussion has focused on certain specific aspects of a recent proposal released in France 
advocating a ‘clarification’ at the EU level that hosting providers that make available copyright works 
uploaded by third parties do not benefit from the immunity in Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive. 
This would be necessary – among other things – because of the allegedly incorrect interpretation by 
the CJEU of relevant principles contained in this piece of EU legislation.  
 
This contribution has instead highlighted how the CJEU has correctly applied relevant provisions in the 
Ecommerce Directive and, above all, how the removal of Article 14 immunity for this type of hosting 
providers would not provide rightholders with significantly greater protection than the one already 
enjoyed under the existing legislative framework, at least as far as their primarily liability is concerned. 
This is also because the current understanding of the right of communication to the public does not 
seem to suggest that intermediaries otherwise protected by the Article 14 safe harbour could be held 
primarily liable for the doing of unauthorised acts of communication to the public.  
 
Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive provides a balance of different interests (both of rightholders 
and intermediaries) and, if applied correctly, already grants protection against infringements 
committed by ‘false’ hosting providers.  As such, a revision of Article 14 of the Ecommerce Directive 
would not serve to expose passive hosting providers to the risk of primary liability for making available 
copyright works provided by third-party users of their services. Things could differ in relation to 
secondary liability, but intervention in this area would mean carrying out an extensive harmonisation 
effort that – so far – has substantially eluded EU legislature. 
                                                             
ons containing hyperlinks to websites on which copyright-protected works, such as films, series and live broadcasts 
are made directly accessible, without the authorisation of the right holders? 
2) Does it make any difference 
- whether the copyright-protected works as a whole have not previously been published on the internet or have 
only been published through subscriptions with the authorisation of the right holder? 
- whether the add-ons containing hyperlinks to websites on which copyright-protected works are made directly 
accessible without the authorisation of the right holders are freely available and can also be installed in the 
mediaplayer by the users themselves? 
- whether the websites and thus the copyright-protected works made accessible thereon — without the 
authorisation of the right holders — can also be accessed by the public without the mediaplayer? 
3) Should Article 5 of the Copyright Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC) be interpreted as meaning that there is no ‘lawful 
use’ within the meaning of Article 5(1)(b) of that Directive if a temporary reproduction is made by an end user during 
the streaming of a copyright-protected work from a third-party website where that copyright-protected work is 
offered without the authorisation of the right holder(s)? 
4) If the answer to question 1) is in the negative, is the making of a temporary reproduction by an end user during the 
streaming of a copyright-protected work from a website where that copyright-protected work is offered without the 
authorisation of the right holder(s) then contrary to the ‘three-step test’ referred to in Article 5(5) of the Copyright 
Directive (Directive 2001/29/EC)? 
77 In particular Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB, C-466/12, EU:C:2014:76; and BestWater International GmbH v 
Michael Mebes and Stefan Potsch, C-348/13, EU:C:2014:2315.   
78 See for instance, in France, the decision of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris in SACEM and Others v APP/DM (6 April 
2015), that held that the provision by an intermediary of links to online storage sites and servers to circumvent technological 
protection measures is a copyright infringement. 
